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The Limits of the "Secular Humanist" Interpretation 
of the Constitution 
PETER AUGUSTINE LAWLER 
Berry College 
There were at the time of America's founding, and there have been 
ever since, factions in American politics roughly corresponding to to· 
day's "secular humanists" and "fundamentalists." These two factions 
I understand to represent two extremes on the American political spec· 
trum, and I call them by names that highlight their extremism. Their 
existence should be understood as intrinsic to the American idea of 
liberal democracy. They are, from one point of view, the extreme par· 
tisans of liberty and the extreme partisans of democracy. This ex-
tremism stems from the fact that the members of one faction tend to 
reject the legitimate claims of the other. 
Because there is a connection between reason and self-love in 
human beings, there will always be partisans of one-sided principles in 
a regime effectually dedicated to liberty. This extremism, by itself, 
ought to be no cause for alarm. It is only necessary for a liberal 
democracy to endure that one set of extremists not triumph definitely 
over the other. The future of liberal democracy would seem to depend 
on the continued existence of and limited victories of both secular 
humanists and fundamentalists. Because my audience is composed 
primarily of scholars and other "intellectuals," I will take this oppor· 
tunity to discuss the excesses of secular humanism. 
Secular humanists, conceived as one set of extremists, are par· 
tisans of liberalism or even libertarianism even at the expense of 
democracy. 1 They understand religious freedom to be freedom from 
religion, from the vulgar superstitions that form the beliefs of most 
human beings in their credulity and timidity. They tend to view the 
very existence of strongly held religious belief as a threat to religious 
freedom and freedom, generally. The effectual truth of religion in 
politics is that it is used by anti-liberal rulers or tyrants to bring the 
"people" to their side, against the few comparatively "free thinkers" 
who oppose the tyrannical imposition of opinion. The fact that most 
human beings, experience shows, seem to need religious belief and 
religious support for moral duty is evidence against their integrity and 
capacity to live freely, not in favor of the truth of religion. 
American secular humanists do not conceive the First Amendment 
as requiring or permitting laws that would be explicitly anti-religious. 
All they demand, all they believe they can realistically demand, is that 
all opinions about moral and religious matters, all opinions concerning 
the "conscience," be treated with the strictest equality. Nothing, in 
particular, must be done to deprive the nonbelievers of the same 
respect accorded to believers, although such degradation is the propen-
sity of the inevitably religious majority. 
Secular humanists argue, almost always with sincerity and often 
with considerable persuasiveness, that their opposition to religion is 
not opposition to morality. They are, in their way, among the most 
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moralistic of Americans. They assert that the foundation of morality 
can be established without reference to God. Experience shows, after 
all, that those in political life who are motivated primarily by religion 
are more characteristically unjust, even fanatically unjust, than they 
are just or dutifully protective of the rights of others. There are also 
many examples of free, just and truth loving human beings who are not 
or were not religious. 
Granting for the moment the credibility of the argument that 
morality can be merely humanistic, it can still be said that such a 
morality will probably never be affirmed by most democratic citizens 
anywhere. Secular humanism is the morality of intellectuals, primarily . 
It is not at least fully shared by those who do not specialize in the 
cultivation of ideas. Whatever John Dewey or Karl Marx say about the 
possibilities for the future of democracy in a world where the necessity 
of specialization will disappear, it is clear that their hopes for 
democratic morality do not fit the American experience so far. 
Secular humanism, then, is fundamentallly "aristocratic," when 
excellence is defined in terms of intellectual cultivation. James 
Reichley traces its origins to the classical Greeks, interprets the 
Enlightenment attempt "to break the ties between humanism and 
theistic religion" as a partly successful attempt to revive the classical 
perspective, and concludes that, since this revival, "its influence has 
generally followed an ascending course." In the United States today, 
Reichley says, secular humanism " is now probably the dominant value 
system in the intellectual community ."2 As the influence of intellec-
tuals on American politics and culture grows, the influence of secular 
humanism grows. 
Still, Reichley goes on, America may be distinguished among to-
day's liberal regimes by the fact that here "religion remains a powerful 
force. " 3 This resistance is indispensable for liberal democracy's 
perpetuation. The "value system" or morality of secular humanism 
cannot wholly shape the public life of such a democracy, a regime in 
which most people must possess the self-restraint necessary to protect 
their liberty. Reichley defends this position through an analysis of the 
attractiveness of the "classical formulation" of humanism . He traces it 
to " two factors: it is compatible with the world view of natural science, 
and it confers membership in a kind of chivalric elite. " 4 Viewing these 
two factors together, secular humanism is the morality that binds 
together the few who have the strength of character to affirm both 
moral principles and scientific truth . 
Most human beings cannot live well with the truth of science, and 
those who can have every right to be proud . This conclusion is, to say 
the least , unfriendly to the pretensions of democracy. When living in a 
democracy , those who affirm it, Reichley observes, are "driven to 
hyprocisy or cynicism." 5 The "hyprocisy" is necessary for "liberals" 
to rule "democrats " in the name of liberty. The "cynicism" is reserved 
for those who conclude that they are too good to rule democrats if they 
must hypocritically acquire their consent. 
Reichley's analysis points to the conclusion that the secular 
humanist claim to rule, when recognized , angers most Americans. The 
best evidence that this anger is a perennial part of American political 
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life is that the perceived secular humanism of the authors of the Con-
stitution angered many of the anti-Federalists. The striking absence of 
any mention in the Constitution of the dependence of human beings on 
God and the Constitution's rejection of any religious test for office 
seemed to mean that its authors had declared the independence of 
America's rulers from God himself. This pretentiousness suggested an 
absence of true respect for any limits to their rule. 6 
The anti-Federalist author Aristocrotis, in his "The Government 
of Nature Delineated," exposed this pretentiousness by means of 
caricature. He illuminates through "exaggerated satire" an aspect of 
human affairs that would otherwise remain obscured by the complexity 
of human reality. 7 His argument is not that the supporters of the Con-
stitution were simply partisans of tyranny, but there was a tyrannical 
aspect to their project that is particularly anti-democratic in its intention. 
The authors of the Constitution believed they had established the 
first government "according to nature." This recourse to what is right 
by nature in opposition to tradition and religion was their point of 
pride. This pride or self-love, however, distorted their understanding 
of nature. They believed nature intended them to rule. This intention 
they learned from nature through "instinct," or the "aspiring feelings 
given them by nature, such as ambition, emulation, etc." 8 
A government "according to nature," then, is one which one frees 
the "natural aristocracy" from the "annoyance or controul from every 
power on earth." The primary obstacle to this independence is "vulgar 
opinion," which is, by its nature, too obstinate to defer willingly to the 
"law of nature." 9 The vulgar or the democrats are too stupid or too 
crude in their feelings to perceive the self-evidence of the aristocratic 
claim to rule. They do not recognize it because they are not aristocrats. 
There is, "natural" aristocrats candidly acknowledge, a connection 
between self-love and reason, but self-love is a gift of nature . 
The Constitution's true purpose is to humor the "mistaken no-
tions" of the vulgar while gradually eliminating their influence. The 
ambiguity and vagueness of every restriction of the power of the 
government in the Constitution will work to the advantage of those 
who can most "dextrously" manipulate meaning. 10 The Constitution 
means, in truth, to limit as far as possible the democratic principle of 
election or consent, replacing it with the "energetic" wisdom of those 
who know or feel the "self-evidence" of the law of nature.11 
One vulgar opinion that is dispensed with is that "the will of the 
sovereign" is limited by the "decrees" of religion. The "incumbrance" 
of religion is one which "has hitherto proved too powerful for the 
united efforts of all the legislators and philosophers that ever appeared 
in the world to conquer." It has always been the case that "the most 
absolute rulers in the world" have found "their power abridged by 
religion." 12 
The Constitution's declaration that there will be no religious tests 
for office, then, will make the American rulers the most independent of 
all time. Its supporters view all the governments that have heretofore 
existed as "contemptibl[y)" weak in their dependence on vulgar beliefs 
in "the visionary terrors of religion." The Constitution replaces fear of 
God with fear of government. Its "energetic" construction of the ability 
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to impose effectually this-worldly punishments will achieve religion's 
proper end of popular control "infinitely better." 13 
The Constitution is particularly opposed to the power of Christianity, 
the religion "professed by a great many of the vulgar in this country." 
Of all the religions it is the one "most unfavorable to a government 
founded upon nature; because it pretends to be of supernatural divine 
origin and therefore sets itself above nature. " 14 Its claim is that it 
limits all claims of rule by human beings, even those that are "by 
nature." 
Christianity opposes the pretensions present in the way of life 
favored by natural aristocrats. Its vulgar morality of simplicity is 
meant to reveal the emptiness of aristocratic "fashion." Its very ex-
istence reminds "gentlemen" that all their claims for superiority are, 
in truth, very far from "nature. " 15 
More fundamentally, Christianity "prohibits slavery," or the idea 
that the "persons and property [of slaves] must be entirely at the will 
and disposal of their masters." No person is subordinate in his or her 
entirety to any "natural" ruler or even to rule by nature. Christianity 
"commands to call no man upon earth master or lord." But, according 
to the supporters of the Constitution, "all the subjects of a good 
government ought to be slaves in a political sense," or totally subor-
dinate to its will.16 The commands of Christianity and the commands of 
the Constitution are incompatible. 
If religion is to remain in America, then, it must not be Christianity. 
A government according to nature can only be supported by "the 
religion of nature." Not surprisingly, "most of the members of the 
grand convention are great admirers of it." It "admits of proper 
degrees and distinctions amongst mankind" or of natural rulers and 
natural subjects.17 Its lack of belief in the "supernatural" is really a 
lack of belief in anything that limits the assertions of rule by "natural" 
aristocrats. 
The core of natural religion is the doctrine that the supernatural, 
personal God of the Christians does not exist. It also teaches that some 
human beings have been given by nature "divine qualities," and it 
would be "blasphemy" against nature "to suppose that she confers her 
gifts in vain." 18 Its adherents tend "to consider themselves as God and 
all the rest of mankind as two legged brutes. " 19 This disappearance of 
human distinctiveness is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that 
there are no natural or divine limits to the authority of those who have 
been given by nature the desire and the ability to command. 
Aristocrotis's conclusion is that the passion opposing religion, 
especially Christianity's claim that there are supernatural limits to the 
natural inclinations of human beings, which is at the source of the Con-
stitution's silence on religion, is a passion for tyranny. Those who feel 
themselves gifted with the right to command have declared their in-
dependence from all "vulgar" restraints. The idea of restraint itself is 
vulgar. By nature, the strong-those who can and feel they must com-
mand-are free from every vulgar or religious perception of a moral 
order which exists independently of human will. 
This conclusion seems to ignore with monstrous injustices the anti-
tyranni passion that motivated the founders to oppose radically the 
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political influence of religion. Their hatred of "religious slavery" 20 is 
amply documented. They believed that the liberating power of "the 
light of science," as Jefferson put it, would lead human beings away 
from the tyranny of "monkish ignorance and superstition" and toward 
the true foundation of human liberty in "the rights of man." 21 
But to show that Jefferson and the other secular humanists or par-
tisans of "the religion of nature" among the founders were genuine 
and effective opponents of "fraudulent regimes" legitimized by 
"degrading superstitions" is not necessarily to save them entirely from 
the sting of Aristocrotis' s satire. 22 Aristocrotis understands the endur-
ing value of Christianity to be its democratic defense of the liberty of 
all human beings, its use of belief in the "supernatural" or divine foun-
dation of human liberty to oppose slavery or the total domination of the 
individual by political rule. Although it seems that the Lockean 
understanding of nature which produced the doctrine of natural rights 
accepted by the "enlightened" founders also opposes slavery firmly in 
principle, it is not at all clear that this principle could ever prevail in 
practice without religious support. 
This Lockean opposition to any natural and hence real justification 
for slavery, this doctrine of rights, is America's secular political morality. 
It is perhaps properly called a morality "according to nature" in the 
sense that its foundation is in the Lockean "enlightenment" concern-
ing the truth about nature. This truth, it must be said, is hardly con-
ducive to the self-restraint ordinarily associated with the idea of 
morality. It reveals that there are no divine or natural or any other ex-
ternal limitations to the individual's acquisitiveness and acquisition. 
The individual is only limited by his own egoistic calculations con-
cerning the consequences of his actions on the behavior of others. 
Strictly speaking, or theoretically, "no man," according to Locke, "is 
under any obligation to respect the inalienable rights of another man 
until that man is necessary for the security of his own rights.' '23 The in-
dividual concludes that slavery is wrong, for example, not on the basis 
of the human worth of or the injustice done to the enslaved person, but 
on the basis of calculations beginning with the fact that he is afraid of 
being a slave himself. 24 
Jefferson and the rest of the most enlightened founders were op-
posed to all human slavery-including the enslavement by Americans 
of blacks-and their anti-slavery principles were embedded in the 
original Constitution. 25 But they still constructed a Constitution that 
tolerated the existence of slavery in America, and with remarkably lit-
tle moral anguish. According to Harry Jaffa, "the widespread lack of 
concern over the moral challenge of Negro slavery to the doctrine of 
universal rights in the Declaration in the revolutionary generation can 
be traced to the egoistic quality of these rights in their Lockean [ or 
wholly 'natural'] formulation. "26 
This doctrine, then, is not always an effective antidote to tyranny. 
Even Jefferson, when writing of the tyrannic effects of slavery on the 
"customs and manners" of Virginia's masters, asked "can the liberties 
of a nation be thought secure when we have removed from them their 
only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liber-
ties are the gift of God?"27 The truth about nature, or even some merely 
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natural religion, cannot motivate "the people" to protect the rights of 
others when it is not in their immediate interest to do so. Nature does 
not evidently or evidently enough teach the equal liberty of all, if only 
because one's perception of nature is determined in part by self-love. 
"The people," according to Jefferson, need to believe that their 
rights are a gift of God to respect them as a principle of political morality. 
A humanistic morality, as Harvey Mansfield, Jr. states Jefferson's con-
clusion, needs "superhuman" support. 28 But Mansfield and Jefferson 
do not go far enough. Within Locke's view of nature, man knows no 
higher being than man.29 Anything truly superhuman must also be 
supernatural. Religion, particularly the biblical-Christian religion, 
must to some extent support the decision not to tyrannize for 
those-such as the South's masters-who have the opportunity to do so. 
Jefferson undertook an elaborate project to purge Christianity of 
its "supernatural" or unreasonable dimension, to make it a natural or 
rational religion, for the benefit of the American people. 30 His project 
did not achieve the success that he hoped it would. 31 On the basis of his 
own reflections on the sources of anti-slavery morality, it was good for 
the American idea of liberty that he did not. 
So far, moreover, the precise concern of Aristocrotis has not been 
addressed: the effect of the Constitution's opposition to religion on 
American rulers. Jefferson never said that all Americans would need to 
believe that their liberties are the gift of God. He, like most of the other 
''enlightened'' or most secular humanistic of the founders, believed 
that such false belief would be unnecessary for "minds of a peculiar 
structure," which, through a "refined education," would find the true 
or secular foundation of morality. 32 A free people is, in truth, composed 
of the few who know and the many who believe. 
The rulers, the natural aristoi that Jefferson hoped would hold of-
fice in America, 33 would not need religion to act well. Would their 
responsbile use of their power be based simply in their superior ability 
to perform Lockean or egoistic calculations? Such calculations, accord-
ing to Jefferson, cannot persuade those who have the opportunity to 
tyrannize not to do so. Yet those with extraordinary minds and other 
political skills, those gifted by nature might well have such oppor-
tunities. Why do they not conclude that aristocratic tyranny-the 
tyranny of those gifted by nature-is not "according to nature?" 
One possible answer to this question is that even the most 
enlightened of the founders did not apprehend fully the radicalism of 
Locke's understanding of nature. Their Locke was the "exoteric" or 
superficial, not the "esoteric" or profound one.34 This Locke retains 
the Christian-natural law idea that there is a natural order which exists 
independently of human making, is of divine origin, is accessible to 
reason, and limits and directs human law. 
But, if the founders' understanding of nature was determined by 
Christian and classical presuppositions at least as much as by the idea 
of liberated egoism, the resulting understanding of human and political 
affairs was not, in Locke's eyes, truly "according to nature." They did 
not affirm all that is implied in the understanding of nature in which the 
doctrine of rights is rooted. They did not, despite their enlightened 
pretensions, really affirm the view that human beings can live well 
54 
without any religion at all. Their "natural religion" was in the crucial 
sense really a religion, not a rationalization for tryanny. 
Many or maybe all of the most enlightened founders may have 
sincerely believed that "the Laws of ature and of Nature's God" 
could be the foundation of a non-egoistic political morality. But, 
Aristocrotis might say, this fact simply means that they did not know 
completely what they were doing; they did not understand the full 
significance of the anti-religious doctrine they were in fact promoting. 
They did not understand the extent to which the uprooting of the 
Christian-natural law tradition on behalf of a new, liberated view of 
nature to which they contributed would create a world in which human 
freedom would seem to know no limits, where anything would seem 
possible, where tyrants would use any and all means to attempt to ac-
tualize constructions of the mind that understands itself to free from 
the limitations of human experience. Such fantastic idealism produced 
the opinion, made famous by Marx but not unknown among the Con-
stitution's supporters, that it is possible for human beings to create a 
world in which religious belief would be obsolete. 35 The tyranny of 
liberated reason or "ideology" was, in truth, the replacement for 
religious tyranny in the world. 
From the perspective of the political scientist attempting to view 
human freedom without the assistance of religious belief, the "lie" of 
religion, particularly the Christian religion, is infinitely less pernicious 
than the lie of ideology. The latter denies the existence of the trans-
political and even trans-material freedom and dignity of the human per-
son. Aristocrotis was right: The destruction of Christian view of 
human liberty and "the death of God" really did remove restraints on 
the imaginations of potential tyrants. 
With this conclusion in mind, the anti-Federalist objection to the 
Constitution's silence on the individual's dependence on and even on 
the very existence of God is made in part on behalf of the effectual pro-
tection of human liberty. If freedom of religion is freedom from 
religion, it is freedom from acknowledgment of the fact that all human 
beings are equally dependent on and responsible to a Creator, that they 
are all "created equal." An anti-religious or even a radically anti-
Christian constitution is also at heart an anti-democratic one. 36 
If the language of the Bill of Rights is best interpreted in terms of 
an argument between the supporters of the Constitution and the "anti-
Federalists" in which neither side triumphed completely, then the 
language of the First Amendment's religion clauses cannot be inter-
preted without acknowledging the possibility that they introduced into 
the Constitution some partisanship on behalf of religion, that they were 
to some extent a democratic correction to the secular humanist ex-
tremism that seemed to have prevailed at the Constitutional Conven-
tion. 37 The First Amendment, instead of defending the ''equal rights of 
conscience," as Madison wanted, def ends "the free exercise of 
religion." The term "religion" is more definite than "conscience"; it 
more specifically denotes the purpose of human liberty. Its conclusion 
in the Constitution is to some extent an anti-Federalist generated 
recognition of the religious dimension of human liberty and hence a 
specific limitation on political rule and even political liberty. 38 
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Such a definition of religious liberty, even James Madison realized, 
is the only one that could be defended in public, before the people, in 
America. It is the one he used in his "Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments," where religious liberty is defined as 
a gift of nature for the discovery of the duty of a creature. 39 He knew 
that the American people would not accord explicitly equal respect to 
belief and nonbelief. Consequently, he believed that the consciences of 
atheists and even believers in a merely natural religion would be better 
protected by America's rulers acting on an "assumed power" they 
would discover in the Constitution's denial of religious tests for office 
and silence on the existence of God than by constitutional 
amendment. 40 
According to Gary Glenn, the anti-Federalist purposes embedded 
to some extent in the First Amendment have been "forgotten." 41 He is 
right if he means that almost no one before him seems to have read the 
anti-Federalist authors carefully for illumination concerning the mean-
ing of the Amendment's religion clauses, and even he has not read 
them carefully enough. But these democratic purposes have never 
been forgotten, and they do not depend on the authority of anti-
Federalist authors for their validity. There has always been, in 
America, democratic opposition to the "liberal" idea that human liberty 
has no "superhuman" or "supernatural" limitations, the idea of 
"secular humanism" in its precise or Lockean sense. 
This resistance is reflected in the genuinely biblical dimension of 
the most inspiring American political rhetoric-such as that of 
Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King Jr.-on behalf of the 
democratic or egalitarian idea of liberty and against tyranny. It is found 
today in legislative and even presidential opposition to the Supreme 
Court's quest for extremely liberal or libertarian principled consistency 
in its interpretations of the First Amendment's religion clauses. It is 
also found in the opinions of some Supreme Court Justices, particularly 
those of Justice Rehnquist, which deny that the Constitution requires 
government to be absolutely neutral in the dispute between belief and 
non-belief and hence do nothing which would indicate its respect for 
religion. 42 
My purpose, to repeat, has not been to promote without any limita-
tions or qualifications the partisanship of America's "moral majority." 
I do not call for the destruction of liberty by democracy. I only meant to 
show that these partisans, when resisting the total domination of con-
stitutional interpretation by "liberalism" understood as secular 
humanism, are defending a constituent part of America's liberal 
democracy. 
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